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In this paper we point out that the theoretical predictions concerning Employment Protection 
Legislation (EPL) are not fully confirmed by empirical evidence in Italy, a strict EPL country 
according to OECD. In particular, worker flows computed from both social security dataset 
and LFS are remarkably high (among the highest of continental Europe), no matter which 
measure of worker flows is considered (Gross worker Turnover and Gross worker 
reallocation). Moreover, we argue that geographical differences among regions are quite 
surprising. Even if EPL is the same across regions, worker flows are higher in the South, a 
region usually supposed to be the least dynamic of the country, than in the North. The 
standard explanation of the higher flow rates in the South usually concerned the different 
economic structural composition of the regions (basically firm size and sectoral composition). 
Using the same weighting procedure as Blanchard & Portugal (2001), we have tested this 
hypothesis: even after controlling for structural composition, flow rates in the South remain 
higher. Black labour market, not-standard contracts, public sector incidence are investigated 
as possible alternative explanations of regional differences. Through a Logit estimation we 
find out that none of these factors can fully explain these differences. We have also derived, at 
the regional level, a prevalence of a positive relation between worker flows and unemployment 
duration, as opposed to what is predicted by the theory. To sum up, almost all the results we 
have derived do not confirm the expected impacts of a strict EPL on the Italian labour market 
structure. General considerations about it are derived. 
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1.   Introduction 
Since the beginning of the 1990s a growing literature has been produced on the 
relation between Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) and different indicators of 
the labour market performance. One of the main issues that attracted the attention of 
analysts is the identification of the labour market variables that are most affected by 
different degrees of EPL. 
Quite obviously, the first variable to be analysed was the unemployment rate. 
However, rigorous econometric testing was not able to conclude that EPL has a strong 
impact on the level of the unemployment rate. Hence, in 1999 OECD stated that 
stricter EPL does not appear to influence either average unemployment rates or the 
employment-population ratio. 
Later on, economists shifted their attention to the relation between the degree 
of EPL and dynamical features of the labour market, namely the level of job flows and 
worker flows and the unemployment duration
1. The basic conclusions are the 
following two
2: 
1)  the higher the degree of EPL (according to the OECD index
3, for instance), the 
lower the level of flows on the labour market; 
2)  the higher the degree of EPL, the longer the unemployment duration. 
 
Among the studies that focused on the relation between EPL and both worker 
and job flows, we paid particular attention to Blanchard and Portugal (2001). They 
have provided an empirical test of points 1) and 2), comparing some characteristics of 
the US and the Portuguese labour markets. According to the OECD index, Portugal 
has the strictest degree of EPL while US has the lowest, but, on average, the 
unemployment rates of those two countries are very similar.  
Analyzing flow rates, they find out that there are not relevant differences 
between the two countries, as opposed to what predicted by the theory. In order to 
derive the expected results, Blanchard and Portugal used weighted flow rates, taking 
into account the different labour market structure between the two countries. They 
applied US employment shares according to firm size and sectoral composition to 
Portuguese rates. In Blanchard & Portugal the weighting procedure was able to 
strongly reverse the unadjusted flow rates, displaying quite clearly the predicted effects 
implied by EPL on worker flows (i.e. higher flows in US than in Portugal). In this way, 
Blanchard & Portugal are able to argue that the high degree of EPL in Portugal is the 
                                                 
1 See for instance Blanchard & Portugal (2001), Blanchard & Jimeno (1995), Bertola and Rogerson 
(1997). Pissarides (2000), Mortensen & Pissarides (1999), Cahuc & Zylberberg (2001), OECD 
(1999b)). 
2 Some lately papers have tried to investigate the impact of EPL, and more in general of labour market 
institutions, on other relevant employment variables such as activity rates, employment rates and gender 
differences. See for instance Bertola, Blau and Kahn (2002). In this paper we do not further investigate 
this issue.  
3 EPL degree is a measure of strictness of labour market legislation according to an aggregate index. 
Basically, the OECD index is built weighting three mains components: the legislation concerning 
regular employment (more in details governmental authorizations to fire, notices of dismissal, severance 
payments, unfair dismissals), the one concerning temporary employment and the legislation regarding 
collective dismissal. See OECD (1999b).  3
main cause of both the low level of flows and the long unemployment duration, as 
predicted by economic theory. 
As in Blanchard and Portugal, the relation between EPL and labour flows is 
usually empirically investigated using some cross section analysis displaying that 
where EPL index is high, flow rates are low and unemployment duration is high.  
In this paper we carry out a similar but nevertheless different exercise. We 
investigate this issue inside the same country, taking into account the fact that 
legislations and institutions are the same. If EPL were binding, in the sense that it 
played an important role in the matching process among employers and employees, we 
would expect an almost uniform impact on the labour market structure in the different 
regions. In Italy we would be expecting low mobility and high unemployment 
duration, because of the strict EPL
4.  
Of course this way to proceed does not investigate the causality among 
variables, in the sense that it is only possible to observe correlation among variables 
(EPL and flows) without being able to analyze if there is a variable (EPL) that can be 
interpreted as the cause of the trend and values of the other one (flow rates). This 
weakness is shared with the empirical cross section literature concerning this issue. An 
additional weakness of this part of the literature is that international comparisons are 
usually carried out without taking into account that legislations and institutions are not 
the same across different countries. In our paper we can assume indeed that institutions 
and legislations do not change across Italian regions.  
 
Anticipating our results, we find out that Italian worker flows are remarkably 
high (among the highest of continental Europe), no matter which measure of worker 
flows is considered. Moreover, even if EPL is the same across regions, worker flows 
are the highest in the South, then the Northeast, the Center and the Northwest. In our 
analysis the adjustment procedure à la Blanchard & Portugal does not produce the 
expected results: the standard explanation that southern worker flows are higher just 
because of firm size and sectoral composition differences is not empirically verified. 
Black labour market, not-standard contracts, public sector incidence are 
investigated as possible alternative explanations of the regional differences. Using a 
logit estimation we point out that none of these factors seems to fully explain them. 
Another interesting result we have derived concerns the prevalence of a positive 
relation, at the regional level, between unemployment duration and worker flows level: 
where worker flows are high (low) unemployment duration is high (low). This finding 
is not consistent with predictions stated by labour economics.  
To sum up, almost all the results we have derived seem not to confirm the 
expected impacts of a strict EPL on the Italian labour market structure.  
 
                                                 
4 This high EPL ranking for Italy has been criticized by the Italian Central Bank that claimed that a 
specific Italian labour market institution (the “TFR”) has been erroneously accounted as a firing cost. 
See Banca d’Italia (2001) pp.135-6.   4
For our elaborations we will use the INPS panel data of employees in the 
private sector built by ISFOL. Its characteristics will be briefly described in the 
following sections. Moreover, in order to test some additional hypothesis we will also 
use the Italian Labour Force Survey, more specifically a panel version of it elaborated 
by ISFOL.   
The structure of the paper is the following. In section 2 we define the worker 
flow definitions we use and we explain the characteristics of the databases we use. 
Moreover, international comparisons are introduced, Italian flow rates are computed 
and investigated, the weighting procedure concerning regional differences is presented. 
Section 3 concerns some possible explanations to the regional differences in flow rates 
and the relation between flows and unemployment duration. Section 4 tries to derive 
some conclusions from the findings of the paper.  
  
2.   Worker flow rates definitions and database explanations. 
In this section we will briefly present evidence concerning Italian and 
international labour market mobility, focusing our attention on worker turnover and 
reallocation.  
At first, it may be useful to better explain which kind of flow rate definitions 
we will use in this paper. It is important to notice that a careful reading of recent 
literature
5 points out that it is not unusual to find ambiguities and misunderstandings 
about the definition of flows and about subtle differences in the available database
6. 
First of all it is useful to recall that job flows refer to job creation and destruction 
measured at firm level (e.g. having at disposal information at the firm level), while 
worker flows indicate job transitions as measured on workers (generally computed on 
either administrative and social security data or LFS). Two basic standard measures of 
worker flows will be used in this paper: Gross Worker Reallocation and Gross worker 
Turnover. 
We define Gross worker reallocation at time t (Gwr) as the number of persons 
whose place of employment or employment status differs between t-1 and t. We will 
refer to the Gross worker turnover at time t (Gwt) as the number of accessions plus the 
number of separations that occur during the interval from t-1 to t
7.  
A basic and important difference among Gwt and Gwr is that Gwr compares 
two situations between two moments in time (t and t-1), without taking into account 
what happens during the interval. On the contrary, Gwt measure all the transitions that 
take place during the interval of time between t and t-1. In other words, it is possible to 
argue that while Gwt measures the number of worker transitions, Gwr measures the 
number of workers that participate in the transition. For these reasons, the difference 
                                                 
5 See for example Davis and Haltiwanger (1992, 1995), Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1996), 
Anderson and Meyer (1994), Contini and Pacelli (1995) and, for Italy, Contini, Gavosto, Revelli and 
Sestito (1996) and Contini (2002). In general, it could be noticed a lack of literature about the worker 
and job flows referred to Europe as a whole. 
6 As example of a misurderstanding, Davis and Haltiwanger (1995) claim that “Anderson and Meyer 
(1994) […] construct total turnover measures, but they treat their measures as analogous to the measure 
of gross worker reallocation calculated by Davis and Haltiwanger (1992)”.  
7 Gwt and Gwr definitions are derived from Davis and Haltiwanger (1995).  5
between Gwt and Gwr can provide a measure of how dynamic mobile workers are. 
Moreover, by construction, we must have Gwt ≥ Gwr
8.  
Following the previous definitions, Gwt and Gwr rates are computed by 
dividing worker turnover and worker reallocation by the employment average 
(expressed in salaried job positions): 
O
WT
Gwt = ;  
O
WR
Gwr = ;  
where  WT and WR represent respectively gross worker turnover and gross 
worker reallocation and O is a measure of average employment.  
 
As already stated, for our elaborations we use an administrative Italian social 
security database. This database is supplied by INPS (the Italian social security 
institute). We work on a panel version of this database, elaborated by ISFOL. The 
sample units are salaried full-time workers
9 in all the private sectors but agriculture
10. 
The panel is constructed by merging INPS employee information dataset (O1M) with 
the employer information dataset (DM10) and covers 12 years from 1985 to 1996. This 
means that it is an employer-employee database. The sample scheme has been set up to 
follow individuals born on the 10
th of March, June, September and December, and 
therefore the proportion of our sample on the Italian employees population is 
approximately of 1/90
11.  
Using this database, it is possible to manage properly these mobility issues, 
because for each worker we have the monthly information about mobility. In other 
words, we can compute not only the mobility taking place between two consecutive 
years but also what happens during each year. 
Moreover, in order to test additional hypotheses we also utilise the Italian 
Labour Force Survey supplied by the Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT). 
More specifically, we used a Panel version of the Labour Force Survey, elaborated by 
ISFOL
12, in which we can follow each individual for two years. It is not possible, by 
construction, to have a longer panel using the Labour Force Survey
13.  
                                                 
8It is probably useless to remark that Gwt and Gwr rates and trend have been widely investigated in 
relation to very different theoretical and empirical issues. For a quite exhaustive list of the reasons to 
measure and analyse worker and job turnover see Davis and Haltiwanger (1995), Anderson & Meyer 
(1994). 
9 Apprenticeships and part time workers are excluded from our dataset. This should not alter mobility 
rate estimates, as during ‘80s and early ‘90s respective shares of Italian employment were under 5%. 
10 This is essentially due to the fact that INPS holds different dataset for private sector, agriculture and 
public sector. 
11 This means that if a sampled worker quitted (or was fired), he/she would disappear from the panel and 
could be found again only if he/she started a new salaried job. Obviously if a worker that met sampling 
criteria found a job between 1985 and 1996 a new “record” would be created in the dataset.  
12 Centra M., Discenza A. R., Rustichelli E., (2001), “Strumenti per le analisi di flusso nel mercato del 
lavoro - Una procedura per la ricostruzione della struttura longitudinale della Rilevazione trimestrale 
Istat sulle forze del lavoro”, Isfol, Monografie sul Mercato del lavoro e le politiche per l’impiego, n. 
2/2001, Roma (abstract in english). 
13 Moreover, the results of this paper are, where comparable, consistent with previous analysis carried 
out on the same INPS database. (See for example Giovine M. (1998), Contini, Gavosto, Revelli and 
Sestito (1996), Contini (2002)). In particular, Contini (2002) has recently provided an in-depth analysis  6
2.1  Worker and job flows: an international comparison 
As already stated in the introduction, it is possible to argue that a stricter EPL
14 
is supposed to determine two clear and direct effects on labour market structure: it 
raises the length of unemployment duration and decreases the in-out flows, for both 
job and worker flows. Besides, the final effect on the unemployment rate is 
ambiguous. 
These theoretical results are widely accepted in labour economics
15. 
Unfortunately, empirical studies do not seem to confirm these theoretical results in a 
clear way. It is not difficult to find some clear counter examples. From OECD data 
(see Table 1) it is possible to check that Denmark, Finland, Sweden, France and Italy, 
high EPL level countries, display flows (in particular Job flows) higher than those 

















From Blanchard and Portugal it is also possible to derive that unemployment 
duration (UD) in the UK has a higher incidence than in Denmark, Finland, Norway, 
Sweden and Austria. Even worse was the Ireland’ situation in the early ‘90s: it 
displayed a high level of UD and a very low level of flows, even though it was a low 
EPL level country. Another well-known particular case concerns the huge differences 
                                                                                                                                             
of the worker turnover evolution in Italy from several points of view, distinguishing flows for both 
employee and employer characteristics.  
14 In this paper we do not focus our attention on unemployment benefits, because in Italy this policy was 
almost negligible in the period of interest. On the contrary, in other European country this policy has 
been really important, like in France).   
15 See for example OECD (1999a,b), Mortensen and Pissarides (1999), Pissarides (2000), Blanchard and 
Portugal (2001). 
Table 1: Gross worker turnover and Job turnover: international comparisons
Country Period Gwt Country Period Job Turn.
Belgium 85 41.7
France 87 59.6 France 84-92 27.1
Germany 87 43.8 Germany 83-90 16.5
Italy 86-96 61.0 Italy 84-92 23.4
Spain 40.7
UK 67-85 74.8 UK 85-91 15.3
Canada 74-82 82.2 Canada 83-91 26.3
Japan 90 32.1 Japan 88-92 8.2
Denmark 84-91 57.9 Denmark 83-89 29.8
Netherlands 88-90 22.0 Netherlands 88-90 7.0
USA1 85 51.8 Sweden 85-92 29.1
USA2 68-86 76.0 US 84-91 23.4
USA3 85-93 96.0
USA4 78-84 174.6
Source: Leombroni & Quaranta (2002), OECD (1994), (1996).
*Netherlands and Japan (JobT): just continuing firms data. Denmark:manifacturing sector.
*For Gwt: USA1, France and Germany: (Burda & Wyplosz), USA2: (Blanchard & Diamond),USA 3 and UK: 
(Burgess, Lane and Stivens), USA4: (Anderson & Meyer), Belgium: VanAudenrode, Canada: Baldwin et all, 
Japan: Ishikawa, Spain: Cepr. 7
in unemployment variables between Spain and Portugal: in both countries EPL is strict 
but in Portugal UD is much lower while both the unemployment and mobility rates are 
much higher
16. Of course there are countries in which the theoretical results are 
consistent with the empirical studies, like Germany in which flows are quite low and 
UD high.  
 
Moving our attention to the worker turnover, it is worth noticing that, according 
to the international comparisons carried out by Contini (2002), Italian Gwt rates
17 are 
higher than those observed in other European countries, such as Germany, Spain, 
Belgium and France (see table 1). Differently from Job flows rates, the UK turnover 
rates are the highest in Europe. Finally, US results change in a surprising way 
according to different empirical studies, ranging from 51.80% (a value lower than the 
Italian one) to 174.56%. This is basically due both to the different databases used and 
to the different time periods considered.  
As far as worker reallocation rates are concerned, very few international rates 
are available. To show that Italian rates are remarkably high it is probably enough to 
stress that the US (36.8% in the period 1968-1988 from Davis & Haltiwanger (1995)) 
and the Italian rates (35.7% according to the INPS database (1985-1996) and 43.2% 
according to LFS (1994-1995)) are very close to one another. 
To sum up, for both worker and job flows the theoretical predictions are not 
fully confirmed by empirical data. What could underlie these results? How did the 
economic literature face this inconsistency? 
First of all, attention has been paid to idiosyncratic differences in both data 
collection methods and databases used, which may affect the official statistics (OECD 
1994a, Boeri (1996)). Significant differences could be due to the nature of the 
reporting agency (government vs. private institutions), the unit of measurement (plant 
vs. firm), the coverage of the sample (with or without public employees, with or 
without the smallest firms, etc.), the definition of employment (all workers, just full-
time workers, etc), the frequency of measurement, the differences in labour market 
structure (firm size, sectoral composition). For these reasons, the international 
comparison we carried out is useful to have a first idea about country differences, 
without giving too much importance to each particular rate. 
Another research line stressed the idea that the relation between firing 
restrictions and labour market flows is correctly predicted by the theory and hence, 
ceteris paribus, EPL should lead to lower levels of flows. However, data might not be 
able to test this theoretical result because other institutional differences may determine 
opposite effects on flows. According to this interpretation Bertola (1997) tries to find 
another institution able to offset the effect of EPL on job and worker flows. The 
institution analysed by Bertola is wage compression, i.e. the fact that wage setting is 
more centralized in Europe than in the US. Quoting Bertola, “if an individual firm’s 
relative wage cannot depend on its relative business conditions, then its wage cannot 
decrease upon realization of a negative labour-demand shock, nor increase upon 
                                                 
16 See for example Blanchard, O. and Jimeno, J.F. (1995) in order to deepen this issue. 
17 Total turnover rates computed in our analysis are basically the same as the ones derived by Contini 
because both the period and the database are the same.   8
realization of a positive shock. In the absence of restrictions on layoff, such 
idiosyncratic wage rigidity would imply more intense labour shedding (and more 
intense hiring) than in an otherwise similar economy where relative wage differentials 
and wage fluctuations are relatively unregulated
18”. In other words, Bertola claims 
that when wage compression policies and EPL are implemented simultaneously the 
effects on job and worker turnover are ambiguous, since EPL tends to reduce flows 
while wage compression tends to increase them.  
Bertola’s thesis about wage compression and labour flows seems to be 
interesting but it is very difficult to test, especially because Italian data for worker 
flows does not allow to distinguish between quits and layoffs. Hence, it is not possible 
to evaluate how much the wage compression constraint matters in the dynamics of 
Italian worker flows. In other words, is the binding wage compression constraint that 
implies higher separations and associations rates or is the dynamic of the Italian labour 
market high per se? Besides, even if Bertola’s thesis were verified it would not explain 
the high differences among European countries’ flows, characterized by similar wage 
setting institutions.  
Another interesting approach to the explanation of the trend of the most 
important unemployment variables is that followed by Blanchard and Wolfers (2000). 
They try to combine the role of shocks and institutions in the rise of European 
unemployment, starting from the observation that neither the institutions alone nor the 
shocks alone have been able to explain relevant differences between European 
countries. In their paper Blanchard and Wolfers do not analyse directly the dynamics 
of the labour market but focus their attention on unemployment rate trend.  
 
2.2  National and regional Worker Turnover and Worker Reallocation in Italy 
Table 2 displays the average Italian rates from 1985 to 1996 for Gwt, Gwr, 
accession and separation. From figure 1 it is possible to observe that, roughly 
speaking, turnover and reallocation rates grow until 1990, then decrease until 1993 and 
grow up again to 1996. This trend confirms the pro-cyclical pattern of these flows 
rates. Moreover, it is worth noticing that all curves display similar trends. In particular, 
the accession and the separation rates (which are the two components of the worker 
turnover) do not display significative differences, but accession rates seem to be more 







                                                 






1985-1996 35.7 60.6 30.2 30.4
Source: panel Isfol on INPS data
Table 2: Yearly gross worker reallocation, gross worker 
turnover, accession and separation rates in Italy, 1985-96. 9
Total turnover and reallocation rates are, as expected, higher in small firms, 
while they diminish in very large plants. As Table 3 displays Gwt  rates in 1-to-5 
employee firms are five times higher than more-than-500 employee firms.  
Gwt and Gwr rates in different regions
19 of Italy are reported in table 3. The 
figures are computed as 11-year average. The South, which is supposed to be a 
depressed region, displays the highest rates, for all worker flows measures. The 
Northeast, which indeed is supposed to be the most dynamic region, is the second most 
mobile region, then the Centre and the Northwest, which is the least mobile. From 
table A2 (in appendix) it is possible to identify the most important structural variables 
of regional labour markets: in the South the unemployment rate is clearly higher than 
in the other regions, as well as the rates concerning long-term unemployed. However, 
activity rates are lower in the South. 
 
It is important to stress that the remarkable regional differences cannot be 
explained by differences in EPL as well as by differences in institutions, which are 
almost the same across Italian regions. EPL is not always exactly the same because 
some details may change according to a specific region. In other words, the basic idea 
behind the labour market legislation is the same at the national level, but some 
operational details may change at the regional level. When regional differences occur, 
EPL is always stricter in the South than in the other regions, in order to better protect 
the higher share of unemployed and long-term unemployed
20. Furthermore, if it were 
possible to compute regional EPL indexes, the South would display a stricter EPL than 
the other regions. If it were the case, we would expect, according to economic theory 
predictions, lower flow rates in the South and a higher unemployment duration. Our 
findings point out that in Italy empirical evidence is quite the opposite to what is 
predicted by economic theory. 
 
                                                 
19 Italian Islands (Sardinia and Sicily) are included in the Southern regions. 
20 Two tipical examples of this are, for instance, the ‘Cassa integrazione guadagni’ and the ‘mobilità 
lunga’, which are more generous with the workers of the South, even if the basic idea of the legislation 
is the same at the national level.  


































Some additional comments on Gwt and Gwr are useful to better understand 
what we are talking about. According to Table 3, it is interesting to observe that in 
some regions, like the Northwest, Gwt and Gwr rates are quite close (in the period 85-
96, Gwt = 49.3% and Gwr = 30.9%, the difference is 18.3%) while for other regions 
the gap is much wider: for the South (Northeast) Gwt amounts to 79.3% (68.5%), Gwr 
to 35.2% (45.7%) and the difference is 33.1% (33.3%). The economic meaning of 
these differences is quite important. Since the Gwt measures the number of worker 
transitions and Gwr measures the number of workers that participate in the transitions, 
the difference between Gwt and Gwr should represent a proxy of how much the 
workers changing either employment status or place of employment between periods 
(see the definition of Gwt and Gwr in the first section) are characterized by additional 
accessions and separations during the interval. 
Results concerning differences between Gwt and Gwr are not surprising. In the 
Northwest this difference is the lowest, meaning that the additional mobility of the 
workers changing employment status or place of employment is not very relevant. On 
the contrary, regions like the Northeast and the South are characterized by a higher 
difference between Gwt and Gwr, meaning that the additional mobility of workers 
engaged in Gwr is substantial: in the analysed period mobile workers change their 
status and place of employment more than once a year and these changes are not 
captured by taking differences of the stocks
21 of employed workers (Gwr).  
 
2.3 Hypotheses and test for weighting schemes.  
The figures reported in the previous sections allow us to draw some preliminary 
conclusions. First of all, Gwt and Gwr rates differ significantly at the regional level. 
Which factors can explain these gaps?  
According to table 4, one of the most intuitive explanations might be found in 
the distribution of firms according to size in different areas. In Southern Italy the share 
of employment in small firms is higher than in the rest of Italy: more than 44% of 
                                                 
21 The term ‘stock’ is used because Gwr capture differences between two periods, while changes 














Source: panel Isfol on INPS data
Table 3: Gwt, Gwr and Weo according to 
geographical location and firm size.
Area
Firm size
Area and size 11
salaried workers is employed in less-than-15 employee firms, while in the Northwest, 
for instance, the same share is about 27.5%.   
 
This evidence suggests that overall rates should be affected by regional 
economic structures: the higher the shares of employment in small firms, the higher the 
flows rates.  
To preliminary test this hypothesis we computed Gwt and Gwr rates for each 
size class and geographical location. Table A1 (reported entirely in appendix) confirms 
that, even when controlling for size effect, Southern Italian rates are higher than in the 
rest of the country. In particular, even when focusing on small and medium size firms, 
Southern Italy outstands the rest of the country in terms of mobility.  
Sectors of activity seem equally important when determinants of mobility are 
investigated. Figures are reported in table A.3 (see appendix). Construction, trading 
and public and private services are characterized by higher Gwt and Gwr rates with 
respect to other sectors. On the contrary, finance intermediation and heavy industries 
workers are less mobile.  
The effects of firm size and sectoral composition can be jointly taken into 
account applying a weighting procedure to the rates computation
22. For instance, 
Blanchard and Portugal (2001) used weighted flows in order to compare Portuguese 
and US flows. In particular they applied US employment shares according to firm size 
and sectoral composition to Portuguese rates and discovered that, after the adjustment, 
in the European country Gwt rate was lower than in US.   




k j k j





                                                 
22Broadly speaking, a set of weights can solve two kinds of problems: (a) the comparison of the 
magnitude of flows in different areas; (b) the correction of sample bias produced by the sampling 
procedure. In the former case an identical structure (e.g. distribution of firms according to size, etc.) will 
be chosen in order to standardize data concerning different areas, that is to say that the same weights 
will be applied to each area. In the latter case, for each area, the reference structure will be derived from 
an official source (a census, for instance) in order to produce more accurate estimates of flows, in other 
words a different set of weights will be used for each area. As the main goal of this paper is to verify if, 
given the same EPL, there are significative differences between the levels of flows rates in different 
areas, the first weighting method will be applied. 
1-5 6-15 16-49 50-199 200-499 500-W
North-west 10,2 17,2 18,4 17,3 9,7 27,2 100,0
North-east 12,2 22,2 23,8 18,5 9,2 14,2 100,0
Central 11,0 16,4 15,4 10,9 5,7 40,6 100,0
South 20,5 24,1 22,9 14,4 7,0 11,1 100,0
Islands 24,5 24,1 20,2 14,1 5,6 11,6 100,0
Italy 12,5 19,2 19,5 15,6 8,2 25,0 100,0




Table 4: Italian salaried workers according to firm size and geographical 
location  in the private sector (%). 12
where a is a geographical area, j  represents the size class, k represents the 
sector and 
R
k j f ,  are the employment shares in the reference structure. 
Basically, we can divide the weighting procedure into two components, the 
turnover (Gwtjk) and the structural (fjk
r) components. The former tells us how mobile 
the workers are in every cell in each country or region (for firm size and sectoral 
composition), while the latter suggests how much every single cell has to weigh in 
order to end up with comparable rates among countries/regions. 
In Blanchard and Portugal (2001) flow rates were strongly reversed after the 
weighting procedure. More precisely, the unadjusted Portuguese rates were higher than 
the US ones while the opposite relation is derived after the adjustment. This means that 
the structural differences between Portugal and US were so remarkable as to imply a 
very relevant impact of the structural component on the weighting procedure.  
Applying the same weighting procedure to our data, we find out interesting 
results. The set of weights we have chosen is the share of salaried workers in private 
sectors for each firm size class and activity sector in Italy. We derived the values from 
both the ‘Intermediate Census of Industry and Services’ of 1996 and from the panel 
itself. 
 
In table 5 we display unadjusted and adjusted rates for the period 1985-1996. 
The main results are the following: 
i)  gaps between regional flow rates tend to reduce; 
ii)  adjusted Southern rates remain higher than the other regions no matter 
which kind of weighting system is used. 
 
To sum up, we can claim that in the Italian case the weighting procedure does 
not produce the expected theoretical results. The standard explanation that in the South 
worker flows are higher just because of differences in firm size and in sectoral 
composition is not empirically verified. Worker flows in the South are higher even 
after the adjustment procedure. Investigating the components of the weighting 
procedure we can claim that the structural component (see for example table 4, where 
it is possible to check that employment shares for small firms are higher in the South 
than in the North) is not strong enough to fully reverse the higher mobility observed in 
North-west 48,9 54,7 52,3
North-East 68,2 65,6 66,9
Central 57 56,7 56,7
South 78,3 69,5 70,8






Table 5: 1985-1996 unadjusted and adjusted Gwt according 
to regions
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the South (see for example Table A1 in appendix, where it is possible to check that for 
every firm size class except the last mobility is higher in the south than it is the North).  
Finally, it is worth to remark that after the weighting procedure Gwt in the 
Northeast and in the Northwest are still far from each other. This is quite interesting 
since Northeast and Northwest are very similar in terms of EPL enforcement and in 
terms of social economic factors other than firm size and sectoral composition. 
 
3  What hides behind regional differences in worker flows rates? 
As already pointed out in section 2, Gwt rates are clearly higher in the South 
than in the North (both West and East): considering that the Northeast is supposed to 
be a region characterized by a very intense and productive economic activity, small 
firm size and high mobility, this is quite a surprising result. Let us try to investigate 
some of the possible causes. We have already displayed that it cannot be attributed 
both to structural composition differences and to institutions and legislations that are 
the same in the different regions. In this section we will try to investigate some other 
possible explanations for these regional differences: the black labour market, the 
incidence of not-standard contracts and the incidence of the public sector.  
 
3.1.1  Possible explanations: the black labour market 
The black market, estimated to be strongly widespread in the South, could be 
considered as a possible candidate. According to Busetta & Giovannini (1998), the rate 
of irregular working positions, in labour units, amounts in the South to 33.5% of all 
working positions, while in the centre and the North the same rate is 18%: the regional 
difference seems to emerge quite clearly.  
Moreover, it can be worth noticing that, according to international definitions
23, 
it is possible to distinguish three different types of ‘black’ labour market: 
a)  illegal activities, carried out by enterprises entirely not registered; 
b)  underground activities, carried out by registered firms that for either economic 
reasons or statistical problems decide to hide some relevant information 
concerning the labour market (evasion of social security contribution, 
distortions of  working time and working position procedures, etc.); 
c)  informal activities, defined by legal firms characterized, for example, by low 
levels of organization, unclear separation between capital and labour, family 
based structure, etc. 
 
We are mainly interested in the first two categories: the illegal one, firms 
entirely not registered, and the underground one, firms ‘partially’ not registered. 
Which could be the main effects on worker flows determined by the black labour 
market
24? At first sight, there are at least two different effects, of opposite directions.  
                                                 
23 In particular the definitions included in SNA93 and SEC95.   
24 A lately paper that tries to evaluate the impact of the black labour market on employment and 
unemployment variables is the one of Boeri & Garibaldi (2002).  14
Firstly, it is worth noticing that some of the “black” market workers in Italy, in 
particular the ones belonging to underground activities of the previous classification, 
frequently get in and out of the labour market in order to acquire the eligibility for 
pension contributions
25. In other words, some of the ‘underground’ workers work most 
of the time in the black market but, in the meanwhile, they have an informal agreement 
with their employers in order to work in the legal market, at least the minimum amount 
of hours needed to acquire the eligibility for the pension system. In this way the 
‘underground’ market might imply a substantial increment in the flows of the “legal” 
labour market. However, it is possible to partially estimate this effect computing the 
job recall rates: since the number of job recalls is very small and it does not change in 
a significant way across regions, it is possible to conclude that this effect should be 
negligible.   
Secondly, since the ‘illegal’ labour market is basically made up by very small 
enterprises, the total turnover of this market should be remarkably high. In this case, if 
a substantial share of the black market in the South, in particular a share of illegal 
activities, emerged in the legal market it would probably increase the total turnover of 
this region, i.e. without including the illegal labour market the total turnover could 
even be underestimated. 
Since the black labour market represents, by definition, an unknown world, it is 
almost impossible to estimate how much these two factors matter in the computation 
of the ‘real’ total turnover rates and therefore it is not possible to establish which effect 
is the strongest, i.e. whether the total turnover in the South is over or underestimated
26.  
 
3.1.2  Possible explanations: the different impact of not-standard contracts 
A second possible candidate to the explanation of the higher Gwt rates in the 
South might be the higher rate of fixed term contracts in this region, which amounts to 
42% of the total of fixed term contracts in Italy
27. A higher rate of fixed term contracts 
implies a higher Gwt rate due to the fact that even if a worker continues to be in the 
same firm at the end of the fixed term period, formally he/she will be laid-off and then 
hired again: a new contract will begin. On the other hand, part time contracts
28 are 
widespread in the Northeast (54% of the part time contracts in Italy). A large share of 
this kind of contracts, being permanent jobs, does not imply any impact on Gwt. In 
other words, different kinds of not-standard contracts widespread in the South (fixed 
term contracts) and in the Northeast (part time contracts) could determine different 
impacts on Gwt in the different regions. 
In order to test empirically these hypotheses we cannot use INPS dataset, 
because of the fact that fixed term contracts are not explicitly recognizable. Hence we 
                                                 
25 It is worth noting that the same argument may hold in order to acquire the eligibility for 
unemployment benefits.  
26 A final remark. In order to fully evaluate the impact of the black labour market on worker flows it 
would be important to introduce in the Panel INPS the agriculture sector, up to now not considered. 
Actually agriculture is the sector mostly affected by the incidence of the black labour market. According 
to ISTAT data, in 1999 the rate of irregular positions, in term of labour units, in agriculture is about 
30%, while in the whole economy it is about 15%.  
27 See for example ISFOL (2001), chapter. 4. 
28 As already underlined, part time contracts are not included in our sample.  15
have used the Labour Force Survey (LFS) supplied by the Italian national institute of 
statistics (ISTAT). More specifically, we have used a panel version of the LFS 
elaborated by Isfol, detecting the same type of workers of the INPS dataset, i.e. 
subordinate workers in all private sectors but agriculture. Using ISTAT LFS we have 
to focus our attention only on yearly Gross worker reallocation rates: we are not able 
to compute the gross worker turnover rates because we do not have detailed 
information on what happens during the period.  
 
First of all, it is important to note that Gwr rates deriving from LFS are quite 
close to the ones derived from INPS dataset. Moreover, the LFS reallocation rates are 
even higher than the ones derived from INPS dataset and the results are also 
qualitatively very similar (the region rank is the same). Of course, this represents an 
evidence of the robustness of previous results: worker flow rates in Italy are high and 
regional differences are remarkable. 
Using LFS we can notice that in the case where we exclude fixed term workers 
Gwr are obviously lower anywhere and remarkably lower in Southern Italy. 
Nevertheless, in this region Gwr remains clearly higher than in the Central and 
Northern regions of the country. However, it is important to note that excluding fixed 
term contract lead us to underestimate the ‘real’ reallocation rates. Actually, not-
standard contracts represent just the ‘juridical form’ through which the higher mobility 
in the South takes place: even without not-standard contracts there would be a demand 
for a higher mobility in the South, i.e. we would have more permanent jobs in the 
South. It implies that the worker reallocation rates computed as if in Italy there were 
no not-standard contracts would probably be in between the two rates we have 





North-West 36,5           31,3                    27,0         
North-East 43,9           36,0                    30,8         
Central 42,7           36,9                    30,2         
South 51,3           41,2                    38,4         
Italy 43,2           35,9                    30,9         
North-West 37,4           32,5                    28,6         
North-East 40,9           32,5                    33,5         
Central 39,9           34,0                    34,5         
South 53,9           43,3                    42,7         
Italy 43,0           35,6                    33,8         
Source: Labour Force Survey elaborated by Isfol
Table 6. Gross Worker Reallocation computed using LFS Panel 










3.1.3  Possible explanations: the different regional incidence of public sector 
The different incidence of the public sector in the Italian regions could be 
another partial explanation of the higher turnover rates in the South. As we can notice 
from table 7 the employment share of the public sector in the South is remarkably 
higher than in the other regions.  
Of course, computing reallocation rates adding public employees to the private 
salaried workers leads to smaller differences between the South and the other regions. 
This is only due to the fact that the reallocation rates are smaller in the public sector 
and that the incidence of the public sector in the South is higher. 
More interesting seems to be the investigation of the indirect effects implied by 
the public sector on the worker behavior. The intuition is that the higher incidence of 
the public sector in the South implies a higher income stability in the families in which 
at least one member works as a public employee. This, in turn, could have two possible 
effects on the worker strategy. On the one hand, it could make the private workers to 
have a higher mobility, looking for either ‘risky’ jobs or voluntary unemployment 
spells to train themselves (being assured by the public employment of other members 
of the family). On the other hand, it could also be possible to observe a disincentive 
effect implied by the higher income stability, i.e. workers feel themselves assured 
against risk and are less encouraged to look for something better.  
In order to test this hypothesis we have detected in the LFS all the private 
workers who belong to a family in which at least another member works in the Public 
Sector. Computing reallocation rates just on these workers we have derived higher 
rates than in the case in which we consider all the private workers. Roughly speaking, 
this means that at the aggregate level the incentives to look for something better are 
higher than the disincentives deriving from the higher income stability (table 7). It 
holds both at the regional and national level. It is also possible to derive this result 
from the logit estimation of the next paragraph. The coefficient of the variable 
concerning the fact of having at least one member of the family working in the public 
sector is significative and positive. At the national level it amounts to 0.11 and for the 
South it increases up to 0.167 (see Table 8). It means that at least a part of the regional 
differences in worker reallocation can be explained by the indirect effects implied by 









Workers with all least one 
member of the family in 
the public sector
North-west 17,65 37,43 36,2 42,0
North-east 18,01 40,85 39,2 51,1
Centre 23,44 39,91 36,3 45,0
South  29,86 53,93 47,4 58,6
Total Italy 22,85 43,02 40 50,7
Source: Panel from Labour Force Survey elaborated by Isfol




3.1.4  An econometric testing of our hypotheses. 
In order to test at the same time all the possible explanations we have taken into 
account we can use a simple econometric model. More specifically, we carry out a 
logit estimation using as a dependent variable the fact of having had a reallocation in 
the last year. Among the explicative variables we have put all the ‘standard’ control 
variables (sex, age, qualification, education) and the additional controls variable we 
have considered in this paper (firm size and sector, fixed term and part time contracts, 





























Table 8. Logit Estimation for both all private workers and public-private workers
Coeff. P-val Coeff. P-val Coeff. P-val Coeff. P-val
Gender Female -0.101 0.000 -0.050 0.086 -0.044 0.022 -0.089 0.025
North-west 0.000 0.000 0.000 -
North-East 0.128 0.000 0.119 0.000 0.122 0.000 -
Centre -0.007 0.795 0.011 0.689 -0.035 0.165 -
South 0.142 0.000 0.231 0.000 0.095 0.000 -
15-24 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
25-34 -0.412 0.000 -0.411 0.000 -0.422 0.000 -0.342 0.000
35-49 -0.472 0.000 -0.469 0.000 -0.497 0.000 -0.362 0.000
50-W -0.195 0.000 -0.192 0.000 -0.207 0.000 -0.238 0.001
High education 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Medium education -0.079 0.024 -0.081 0.021 -0.160 0.000 -0.038 0.523
Low education 0.055 0.165 0.052 0.188 -0.050 0.174 0.150 0.027
Blue collar 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
White collar 0.044 0.079 0.046 0.067 -0.080 0.001 0.009 0.844
Managers 0.580 0.000 0.582 0.000 0.548 0.000 0.579 0.000
0.108 0.001 0.109 0.001 - - 0.167 0.002
- - -0.007 0.013 - - - -
Part time Contracts 1.222 0.000 1.217 0.000 1.176 0.000 1.316 0.000
Fixed term Contracts 1.958 0.000 1.960 0.000 1.933 0.000 1.590 0.000
Public and private serv. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Agriculture - 0.425 0.000 -
Energy distr. and manif. -0.298 0.000 -0.302 0.000 -0.241 0.000 -0.196 0.000
Construction 0.061 0.102 0.058 0.121 0.134 0.000 0.123 0.042
Comm. and tourisme 0.207 0.000 0.206 0.000 0.298 0.000 0.292 0.000
Transport & Comm. -0.087 0.022 -0.088 0.020 -0.050 0.197 -0.098 0.128
Financial interm. -0.216 0.000 -0.218 0.000 -0.117 0.012 -0.202 0.028
Advanced serv. for firms 0.296 0.000 0.293 0.000 0.374 0.000 0.341 0.001
P.A. - -0.181 0.000 -
1-5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
6-15 -0.493 0.000 -0.497 0.000 -0.494 0.000 -0.543 0.000
16-49 -0.726 0.000 -0.731 0.000 -0.710 0.000 -0.689 0.000
50-W -0.800 0.000 -0.804 0.000 -0.787 0.000 -0.819 0.000
Undefined -0.869 0.000 -0.874 0.000 -0.862 0.000 -0.865 0.000
0.248 0.002 0.280 0.000 0.296 0.000 0.254 0.047
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Moreover, we have carried out different estimations in order to test the 
robustness of the results, changing both the sample (at first private workers and then 
private and public salaried workers) and the estimation region (national level and then 
only the South). Our variables of interest are the regional dummies. In other words we 
want to test if even after controlling at the same time for all these variables the regional 
coefficients are significant.  
From Table 8 we can notice that the regional dummies are all significative but 
the centre (which in fact display a similar trend of the omitted category, the North 
west). Moreover, the South displays the highest coefficient. In other words, it is 
possible to argue that there are some other unobservable variables in the South able to 
increase the probability to have a reallocation.  
It is worth noticing that all the control variables behave in the expected way. 
The probability to have a reallocation decreases in firm size, increase for a part time 
worker and even more for a fixed term worker, decreases in worker age, is higher for 
men (even if the coefficient is quite small and not always significative), is smaller in 
the public sector, increases in qualification.  
Moreover, we have tried to test another additional hypothesis (the third column 
in table 8): since unemployment rates are widely different across the country, they 
could be considered as another explanation for regional differences. We have added to 
the logit estimation the unemployment rate variable, classified by 21 Italian regions 
(not the four macro regions considered up to now) and by gender. This additional 
hypothesis does not seem to produce interesting results: the coefficient is really small 
and hardly significative. Moreover, including the unemployment rate variable the 
regional dummies remain significative and the coefficients for South and Northeast are 
even higher.  
 
3.2  A positive relation between worker flows and unemployment duration 
The fact that Gwt is higher in the South raises some interesting questions. In 
particular it is worth noting that unemployment duration is much higher in the South 
than in the North. According to Table 9 (in the appendix), long-term unemployment
29 
(LTU) in the South concerns about 13-14% (60%) of the labour force (of the 
unemployed) while in the North the same rate is about 2-3% (40%). This means that in 
Italy we observe a situation in which worker flows and unemployment duration (UD) 
are positively related, in all regions but the northeast. Roughly speaking, in the South 
worker flows are high and UD is high, in the Northwest and the Centre flows are low 
and UD is quite low. Only in the Northeast flows are high and UD is low.  
According to Blanchard & Portugal and to the standard literature in labour 
economics we were expecting to observe a negative relation between these two 
indicators. In Italy it is possible to observe a negative relation only in the Northeast 
(high flows and low UD). However, quite surprising, this relation is the opposite of the 
one expected in a strict EPL country where flows should be low and UD should be 
high.  
                                                 
29 In order to approximate unemployment duration rates we utilize rates concerning long term 
unemployed computed from LFS. Of course LTU and unemployment duration rates are not the same. 










If EPL was the main institution able to have a relevant impact on the labour 
market structure we should be able to observe the theoretical implications of EPL on 
Gwt in an almost uniform way across the country. Moreover, since we compare 
regional  Gwt across Italy we use the same database and current institutions and 
legislations are the same in the different regions regions. This implies that we cannot 
explain differences in Gwt with the presence of measurement problems and/or effects 
caused by different regional policies. The latter remark implies also that Bertola’s 
explanation concerning wage compression cannot be applied in this framework 
because the wage setting in Italy takes place mainly at a national level, hence wage 
compression is basically the same across different regions
30.  
 
4  Coming back to the employment protection legislation 
In the previous section we have pointed out that empirical evidence concerning 
flow rates in Italy is quite different from what was expected. Since the OECD ranks 
Italy as the second last country for EPL strictness we were expecting low mobility 
rates in Italy. Indeed, we have found out that Italian mobility is the highest in 
continental Europe. Moreover, regional differences, which seem to be relevant even if 
EPL is the same across the country, are not due to structural differences (firm size and 
sectoral composition, not-standard contracts, public sector incidence).  
Besides, the North, in particular the Northeast, displays a high mobility and a 
quite low rate of long-term unemployment, a situation that is usually associated to a 
country with a low level of EPL. On the other hand the South displays the highest 
mobility in continental Europe and a very high rate of LTU, displaying, as already 
stressed, a positive relation between flows and LTU, an odd situation according to 
economic theory.  
To sum up, what is it possible to say about EPL in Italy? Roughly speaking we 
can argue that Italy does not seem to be a country that suffers from the typical 
problems deriving from EPL. Does it mean that EPL is not binding in Italy, in the 
sense that it does not deeply affect the behavior of workers and employers as predicted 
                                                 
30 There is a quite lively debate concerning the decentralization of wage setting in Italy, depending on 
the regional productivity (see for example Brunello, G., Lupi, C., Ordine, P. (2001). 
Table 9: regional relation between worker flows and Long term unemployed
Region GWT GWR
Long term 
unempl.rate    (in 
1994)




North-west 49.3 30.9 3.3 45.2 34.7
North-east 68.5 35.2 2 33.1 28.3
Central 57.6 34.5 4.8 51.1 31.3
South 79.3 46.1 11.3 60.6 24.2
Italy 61.43 35.69
Source: Labour Force Survey, panel version elaborated by ISFOL. 20
by economic theory? Probably, this is a too strong conclusion to derive from our 
findings.  
On the other hand, this paper tries to provide an economic foundation to the 
political debate concerning the reform of EPL in Italy. What are the goals of such a 
reform if the Italian mobility is one of the highest in Europe and LTU is not a serious 
problem in at least half of the country? Why would such a reform be so important for 
the Italian labour market? And why should it be more important than other possible 
reforms (unemployment benefits, active labour market policies, etc.)?  
For sure, there is a rate that is really worrying, among the ones related to EPL, 
the high long-term unemployment rate in the South. However, if it was due to factors 
related either to skill deterioration or to discouraged workers, it could not be useful to 
implement or modify employment protection legislations while it could be more 
appropriate, according to economic theory, to introduce active labour market policies, 
training schemes etc (policies that are not widespread in Italy). 
Moreover, in order to fully evaluate the welfare effects deriving from EPL it 
would be also useful to take into account some positive effects linked to this policy. 
For example, Nickell & Layard (1999) point out that EPL does matter not only 
for unemployment issues but also for economic growth. In particular they argue that 
EPL might imply at least two effects on growth. The first one concerns the negative 
impact of EPL on productivity through the slowing down of the reallocation from old 
and declining sectors to new and more productive ones. The second effect concerns a 
positive impact of EPL on labour productivity. The idea is that EPL implies longer 
tenure of matching and in this way enhances a higher cooperation among workers and 
a higher level of training provided by firms
31. From table 9 we can notice that, as 
expected, the average job tenure is lower in these regions where worker flows are 
higher. Nickell & Layard argue that the second effect should be stronger than the first 
one. In order to test the latter statement they present cross-country estimates of 
productivity growth from which EPL emerges to be the only institution positively 
related to higher productivity growth, while the other labour market institutions seem 
not to have any effect on growth. In this framework EPL would determine two effects 
for economic agents: a cost for employers who want to adjust their workforce and an 
increase in productivity due to the commitment for a stable relationship of employers, 
which in turn stimulates investments in human capital and cooperation.  
A recent paper by Belot, Boone and van Ours (2002) tries to evaluate the 
welfare effects of EPL in a theoretical framework. They display that EPL “might be 
desirable both from the point of view of the worker (job stability and wage gains) and 
of the firm (productivity gains)”
32 Another theoretical paper that tries to point out a 
positive impact of EPL on labour market structure is the one of Pissarides (2001). It 
stresses the relevance of employment protection policies in an economy characterized 
by the absence of perfect insurance markets and by risk averse workers. In this 
                                                 
31 The relation between tenure and productivity could underlie the practices of internal labour market 
strategies by firms. As pointed out by Bruno (1979) such practices has been pursued voluntarily by US 
and UK firms in the sixties. In the Italian framework a stricter EPL could have forced firms to 
experience internal labour market strategies.  
32 Belot, M., Boone, J. and van Ours, J. (2002), p. 3.  21
framework Pissarides (2001) derives the important result that EPL might represent a 
welfare improving policy. 
These issues represent an example of how a more complex evaluation of EPL 
could lead to welfare evaluations completely different from the standard one in which 
EPL is just considered as a friction in the matching process
33. In particular in Italy, a 
strict EPL country but at the same time a country where the standard effects deriving 
from this policy seem not to come out in a clear way, a deeper economic investigation 
of the EPL reform should be carried out in order to better understand the positive and 
negative sides of such a reform. 
 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper we have carried out a wide assessment concerning the relation 
between theoretical predictions regarding EPL and the Italian empirical evidences.  
Let us outline our main findings.  
1)  Italian worker flows are remarkably high (among the highest of continental 
Europe), independently from which measure of worker flows is considered. Moreover, 
worker flows seem to have the usual properties outlined by the previous literature (pro 
cyclical, decreasing in firm size, low in manufacturing and high in services, etc.). 
2)  Even if EPL is the same across regions, worker flows are clearly higher in the 
South. This outcome could be related to differences in firm-size, industrial structure 
and other factors such as black labour market and not-standard labour contracts.  
3)  In order to neutralize the firm-size and industrial structure effects, we have 
computed adjusted Gwt and Gwr rates, using the same weighting procedure of 
Blanchard & Portugal (2001). In Blanchard & Portugal the weighting procedure was 
able to strongly reverse the unadjusted rates, displaying quite clearly the predicted 
effects implied by EPL on worker flows. In our analysis the adjustment procedure does 
not produce the expected results: the standard explanation that Southern worker flows 
are higher only because of firm size and sectoral composition differences is not 
empirically verified. In particular, Northeast worker flows get closer to the Southern 
ones even though the latter remain the highest in the country.  
4)  Among the possible explanations for the regional differences we have focus 
our attention on black labour market, not-standard contracts and public sector. In order 
to test the incidence of the last two factors we have used the Italian Labour Force 
Survey. Flow rates from LFS fully confirm the results deriving from INPS database. 
Moreover, according to a logit estimation it is possible to argue that none of the three 
tested explanations seem to be able explain the regional differences. 
                                                 
33Another part of the literature has also stressed the importance of employment protection in taking into 
account the social cost of the firing decisions made by employers. In order to face macroeconomic 
instability firms hire and fire workers according to their profit maximization, without taking into 
account the social cost that these firing decisions will determine (unemployment benefits for 
unemployed workers, training costs, ect.). In this framework, employment protection can be considered 
as a policy that forces employers to internalise, at least partially, the social costs due to firings. To 
deepen this literature see for instance Feldstein (1976), Millard and Mortensen (1997) and Cahuc and 
Malherbet (2002).  22
5)  At the regional level we observe a prevalence of a positive correlation between 
unemployment duration and worker flow level: where worker flows are high (low) 
unemployment duration is high (low). This finding is not consistent with the prediction 
of a negative relation stated by standard economic theory. In Italy it is possible to 
observe a negative relation only in the Northeast. However, quite surprising, this 
relation is the opposite of the one expected in a strict EPL country where flows should 
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Table A1: Yearly GWT and GWR according to firm size and geographical location.
1990-1992 1993-1995 1985-1995 1990-1992 1993-1995 1986-1995
North-west 96.2                 75.3                 100.5               44.5                 35.0                 45.1                
North-east 116.2               100.1               125.0               46.6                 37.5                 46.0                
Central 100.0               85.8                 106.0               48.0                 39.9                 48.7                
South 129.2               110.7               142.6               63.5                 52.7                 63.9                
Italy 109.8               92.2                 117.7               50.2                 40.8                 50.5                
North-west 70.8                 56.3                 70.9                 38.6                 30.7                 37.5                
North-east 92.2                 81.2                 96.2                 43.0                 34.4                 41.4                
Central 75.9                 68.0                 79.6                 43.2                 36.0                 41.9                
South 98.4                 83.4                 109.2               56.4                 48.2                 56.0                
Italy 83.0                 70.9                 86.9                 44.3                 36.3                 43.1                
North-west 55.0                 47.6                 52.4                 33.1                 27.2                 31.3                
North-east 67.4                 62.3                 67.0                 36.3                 31.7                 35.2                
Central 63.4                 54.9                 60.5                 38.1                 33.1                 36.4                
South 87.6                 70.0                 91.1                 51.1                 42.4                 48.5                
Italy 66.1                 57.3                 65.1                 38.5                 32.5                 36.7                
North-west 45.1                 39.9                 41.2                 28.8                 24.7                 26.7                
North-east 51.8                 48.0                 49.8                 30.8                 27.7                 29.7                
Central 54.0                 47.6                 48.8                 30.8                 27.1                 28.5                
South 64.0                 54.7                 65.2                 42.0                 35.4                 39.5                
Italy 51.5                 45.8                 48.6                 31.8                 27.6                 29.8                
North-west 34.2                 31.5                 31.6                 26.5                 21.5                 23.2                
North-east 42.5                 39.5                 38.7                 28.2                 23.8                 25.2                
Central 32.2                 35.6                 32.1                 26.2                 24.8                 24.5                
South 42.1                 37.2                 42.5                 30.3                 24.8                 27.4                
Italy 37.3                 35.3                 35.3                 27.5                 23.2                 24.6                
North-west 23.7                 19.1                 21.4                 21.8                 16.3                 18.4                
North-east 29.7                 26.4                 28.9                 25.1                 19.4                 20.5                
Central 21.2                 18.1                 19.7                 19.4                 17.1                 17.2                
South 23.3                 19.1                 22.3                 23.3                 16.8                 19.6                
Italy 24.1                 20.2                 22.5                 22.1                 17.1                 18.8                
Source: Panel Isfol on INPS data
















North-west 37,1                   6,6                        2,4                  43,7
North-east 28,5                   5,6                        1,6                  44,5
Central 47,3                   8,5                        4,0                  41,4
South 58,5                   17,1                      10,0                35,7
North-west 45,2                   7,3                        3,3                  43,7
North-east 33,1                   6,0                        2,0                  44,2
Central 51,1                   9,4                        4,8                  40,9
South 60,6                   18,7                      11,3                35,3
North-west 47,2                   7,2                        3,4                  43,7
North-east 35,0                   5,7                        2,0                  43,9
Central 54,7                   10,1                      5,5                  41,1
South 61,8                   20,4                      12,6                34,7
Source: Italian Labour Force Survey.
Activity 
rate
Table A2: Share of long term unemployed (LTU) on uneployed, unemployment and 










Table A.3: Yearly gross worker turnovers and reallocations according to sector of activity.
1986-1989 1990-1992 1993-1995 1986-1989 1990-1992 1993-1995
Mining, Quarrying, Chemical and mineral 
transformation, gas, water and electricity 31,4 36,0 30,9 24,0 27,1 23,0
Manifacturing and steel 44,6 45,8 42,2 30,7 31,6 27,0
Textile, clothing and food 60,9 58,2 49,8 37,8 37,0 30,3
Construction 115,1 115,5 102,7 61,0 56,9 49,1
Wholesale and Retail Trade, Repair 96,3 88,6 71,8 47,3 45,2 36,3
Transports and Communication 39,2 40,1 43,2 24,0 25,2 25,0
Financial intermediation 34,5 37,8 35,3 25,2 26,5 21,3
Public and private services 73,7 70,2 57,4 45,9 41,4 32,4
Total 63,1 62,5 54,0 37,7 37,5 31,2
Activity sector
GWT GWR